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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ROBERT V. TILLER, also known as
ROBERT \ 7 • TILLIER, also known
as ROBERT B. SWANN, and MILDRED MOLINARI,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

LOREN G. NORTON, LOREN G.NORTON, administrator of the Estate of CHARLES CARSON, also
known as H. F. SWANN, also
known as R. C. TILLER, also
known as RO-BERT C. TILLER,
deceased, and- THE EMPLOYERS
LIABILITY ASSURANCE -CORPORATION, LTD., a corporation,
and E. LE ROY SHIELDS, as Executor of the Estate of Grace Cath- ·
erine Carson, deceased and E. LE
ROY SHIELDS,
Defendants and Respondents,

Brief of
Defendants and
CrossDefendants
(Respondents)
Civil No. 7770

and
LOREN G. NORTON, GLORIA
NORTON, wife of Loren G. Norton, EDITH M. HAZELRIGG and
CATHEDRAL OF THE .MAGDALENE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
East South Temple, Salt Lake City,
lJtah, also known as ROMAN
C.A.THOLIC BISHOP OF SALT.
LAKE CITY, a corporation sole,
Cross Defendants.
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN & RICHARDS,
Attorneys for defendant, The Em players Liability Assurance Co'l'poration, Ltd.
SHIELDS & SHIELDS,
Attorneys for E. LeRoy Shields, E. LeRoy Shields, Executor
of the Estate of Grace Catherine Carson, Loren G. Norton,
administrator of the estate of Grace Catherine Carson,
deceased, and Loren G. Norton, individually.
R. VERN McC·ULLOUGH,
Attorney for cross defendant Edith Hazelrigg
TOHN D. RICE,
~
Attorney for eroS's defendant Cathedral of the Magdalene
Catholic Church, also known as Roman Catholic Bishop
of Salt Lake City,· a corporation sole.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action by the purported son and daughter of
the deceased to recover from the administrator and his bondsman for alleged fraud ·of the administrator in proceeding to
distribute all of the .estate to the widow pursuant to the decree
of distribution of the Third District Court.
The allegation of fraud is generally the alleged failure
of the administrator to make a full disclosure to the District
Court of facts known by the administrator. The District Court
found that the Probate Coutt had been informed and possessed
of all the facts known by the administrator, all of which had
been disclosed · in contested proceedings ·extending over a

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

period of many. months. The defendants contend and the
Court found that there had been no concealment or breach
of duty. The facts follow:
Charles Carson died October 8, 1948 (R. 3). On October
11, 1948, a petition was filed by Dr. Howard T. Anderson,
represented by W. D. Beatie, praying for letters of administration of the estate of the said deceased (Ex. L-1; P-1). The
funeral was held October 12, 1948 (R. 4).
On the next day Grace Catherine Carson, the widow, filed
a petition for letters of administration, in which she stated
ttthat he left him surviving the following heirs at law: Grace
Catherine Carson, your petitioner herein, and no other presently known heirs at law." At the time of the filing of the
petition for letters DL Anderson also filed a petition praying
for the appointment of Tracy-Collins Trust Company to be
special . administrator of the estate of Charles C·arson, and
this appointment was obtained ex parte on October 11, 1948.
(Ex. L-1; Order of October 11, 1948).
On October 14~ 1948, the caption· of the cause initiated
by Anderson was amended ex parte by adding after the words
ccCharles Carson," the words ((also known as H. F. Swann,
also known as Henry F .. Swann." Subsequently the caption was
amended further to add the words, ((also known as R. C.
Tiller, also known as Robert C. Tiller."
All such petitions having been consolidated for h~aring,
there ensued in this proceeding a series of objections, crossobjections, answers arid amended petitions and protests, in
7
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which two pertinent questions were raised. These were: ( 1)
· whether Grace Catherine Carson was in fact a surviving widow
of Charles Carson, and ( 2) whether there were children living in Chicago or elsewhere of Charles Carson, as claimed by
the special administrator. These questions were pertinent because they were involved in determining the question of priority
in the appointment of the administrator of the estate and also
because they were involved in determining the heirship of
the children. The details of the hearings on these various petitions and cross-petitions are set out in plaintiffs' brief and
in plaintiffs' complaint and amended and second amended
complaints. The ensuing hearings relative to these questions
were pursued over a period of approximately nine months.
I-Iearings were held particularly on November 26, 1~48,
December 8, 1948, January 19, 1949, January 26, 1949, February 23, 1949, February 26, 1949, March 25, 1949, May 23,
.1949, and June 11, 1949. (Finding of Fact No. 10; R. 147).
During the hearings it became apparent that a .number o!
efforts had beeri made to locate the. purported two children of
Charles Carson both before and after his death. Carson himself. had made either one· or two trips to Chicago and other
parts of the Middle West to locate the children. · He had
employed Lawrence Barclay, of the firm of Barclay and Barclay of Salt Lake City, to assist in making the search. ·He
had s.ent ·letters to former acquaintances ·in the Midwest and
Chicago area~ to endeavor to ascertain further information
concerning the children.
Lawrence Barclay,

represen~ing

Carson, had· likewise

8
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\Yritten a number of letters to various public officials and
agencies in an effort to find the purported children. The special
administrtaor had also made a very serious attempt to locate
them. Between sixty and seventy letters were sent to various
individuals and agencies at the addresses indicated in Carson's
effects. The entire nine months were devoted to the search,
and the entire search was reported to the District Court at
the various hearings on this matter.
In the instant case the Court found that ttsaid search
included the contacting by mail and by telephone of all known
friends and relatives of the deceased in the states and cities of
.
.
his residence prior to Salt Lake City, to-wit: West Virginia,
Ohio, Illinois and South Dakota; that in this search, public
officials were contacted requesting their assistance in this.
search, including sheriffs, chiefs of police and librarians. Search
was also made through medical schools in an attempt to locate
the purported grandson, being the son of Mildred Swann Molinari, and particularly inquiry was made of the chiefs of police
of Chicago, Illinois, and Omaha, Nebraska, wit& correspondence approximating sixty or seventy pieces of ·mail forwarded
and received in this search, in addition·- to the. personal investigations and telephone conversations." (Finding of Fact No.
8; R. 146).
~

The attorneys . for the special administrator were paid
$550.00 for their services in attempting to locate the purported children; $100.00 ·~ras allowed to Lawrence Barclay
for his services performed in connection with the search for
the alleged children, and the sum of $150.96 was fl;lrther
awarded to the special administrator for expenses incurred

9
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in searching for Carson's alleged children. ' (Finding of Fact
No. 13; R. 149).
In addition to the evidence before th~ Court concerning
the alleged children the Probate Court in the · hearing
heretofore mentioned heard a. great deal of testimony
and evidence of various kinds as to whether Grace Catherine
Carson was in fact the wife of Charles Carson. There was
a deposition taken at the LDS Hospital, where Mrs. Carson
was seriously ill, as appears from the ·deposition itself. Testimony was obtained from a number of other witnesses.
At the conclusion of all of this testimony, and as a deter~
mination of the qu~stions presented by the petitions, crosspetitions and pleadings, the Probate Court on July 22, 1949,
made written Findings and conclusions in which it deter··
mined that Carson etc. ((Left him surviving the following named heirs at law: Grace Catherine Carson, your petitioner
herein." (R. 148).
The special administrator thereupon filed his petition for
final account and turned the assets over to the administrator.
(See Exhibit L-1, Petition dated July 7, 1949). The administrator immediately entered upon his duties and caused notice
to creditors to be pub~ished. (Ex. L-1; Order of July 29, 1949,
and Proof of Publication dated July 19, 1949. Questions arose
concerning the sufficiency of the Findings, Conclusions and
Decree, and the written Findings, Conclusions and Decree
were actually signed July 22, 1949. (Ex. L-1).
. The administrator thereupon paid various claims and dis10
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tributed the estate pursuant to a court order. The know ledge
that ~Irs. Carson had of Charles Carson· s children is summarized in Findings of Fact Nos. 15 and 16. (R. 150-151).
Witnesses kne\Y that ~1r. Carson had made trips to the State
of Illinois to determine the whereabouts of the children. At
the time of Carson's death, Loren G. Norton called one
Harry Costello of Toledo, Ohio, to determine whether c·ostello had any knowledge of the existence or whereabouts of
the children, and Costello reported that he had no such tnformation.
During the hearings, and prior to the entry of the decree
by the Court, ((defendants Norton and Shields and Grace
Catherine Carson did not fail to disclose any information they
had as to the whereabouts of said children, and that said defendants made a full and complete disclosure of all facts, information and knowledge in their possession to the Court;
that in some instances the source of information had by Grace
Catherine Carson and defendant Norton was different than
the source of information reported. to the Court by· special
administrator, but that in no instan<;:e did said persons fail
to disclose any information· 1n their possession.'' (Finding of
Fact .No. 15 Ibid.)
Following the signing of the Findings, Conclusions and
Decree by Judge Jeppson in connection with the appointment
of the administrator, both Loren G. Norton and his counsel,
((and all other interested parties, relied upon such findings
and conclusions and decree, and accepted and relied upon the
fact and l~w that Judge Joseph G. Jeppson passed upon the
que~tion of heirship relative. to the estate of Charles Carson,
11
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deceased, and that at. said time and thereafter Loren G. Norton an.d E. LeRoy Shields believed that a full, complete and
thorough search had been made · in said estate to determine
and discover the whereabouts ·and existe~ce, if any, of Mildred
Swann Molinari and Robert V. Tiller, plaintiffs herein, who
had been represented as being the children of Charles Carson,
deceased, and that the said Loren G. Norton, and E. LeRoy
Shields in good faith believed that further search or inquiry
would not disclose any facts which had not been revealed in
the search by the special administrator and others, as fully
disclosed to the Court." (Finding No. ~6; R. 151).
Neither Norton nor Shields, his counsel, at any time objected to the procedure or investigation made and directed by
the Court to attempt to discover the whereabouts of any children of Carson, and they did not withhold any information
concerning these children. (Finding of Fact No. 17; R. 151).
The reason of. the difficulty in locating either of the
two plaintiffs is readily apparent from their own testimony.
Mildred Molinari could not remember the number ·of names
she had used since 192~1 (R. 469). Her best judgment at
the commencement of the cross-examination on the question
was about five (Ibid). She used the name ((Mildred Allen"
in Detroit, Michigan, · to an arresting officer or court official (R. 469, 470) ·. In 1932 in Chicago she used the name
((Mildred Pelligrini" (Ibid). The name ((Pell(grini" at that
time was given to a judge. or clerk. S~e remembered that the
name of the person to whom she gave that name was Judge
O'Connell.
12
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Nineteen days later, on October 26, 1932, in Chicago,
she represented herself as ttAnn M~nners." She gave that
name to a Judge Graver (R. 471). On January 24, 1934,
she gave her name as ((Mildred Felli" in California to a judge.
On December 14, 1935, in St. Paul, Minnesota, she gave the
name nMarian Russo." This name was also given to a public
officer (R. 472). Ori October 27, 1937, in Chicago, she
gave her name as ttJoan Wood" to a Judge McCormick (R.
472). On February 10 ,1932, before Judge McCormick in
Chicago, she gave her name as (tMarcella Gordon" (R. 473)
On March 12, 1938, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, she gave her
name as ((Mildred Pelligrini," and again the name was given
to a public officer (R. 473). On March 15, 1941, in Chicago,
she gave her name as ((Mildred Pelligrini" to a Sergeant Griffith. She also gave the name ((Mildred Pelligrini" to a Judge .
Schiller in making a public record of her name (R. 474). On
August 9, 1948, in Chicago, she gave her name as ((Mildred
Pelligrini," and on January 17, 1950, she gave her name as
((Mildred Pelligrini" to a Judge Donahue Harris (R. 474).
Mrs. Pelligrini or Molinari, or whatever her name was,
or is, was asked:

· ICQ. During this period of time of 1948, that would
be August 9, 1948, ·to the present time, have you
ever had occasion to represent yourself to any public officer there at your address at W ashtenaw
A venue as to identify yourself by name? ?
A. I don't remember." (R. 476). ·

* * * * *
1)
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nQ. Have you ever represented yourself to any public
official, clerk or otherwise as Mildred Molinari ?
A. I dont think so." (R. 476).

* * * * *
'~Q.

You couldn't name one instance for us where you
have publicly made a record of your name as Mildred Molinari ?

A. I don't remember whether I did or not.

Q. You can

thin~·

of none at the present time?

. A. No.
Q. Do you have any real property in your name?

A. No.
Q. Do you own any real property?
A. Yes.

Q .. And it· is a fact, is it, that whatever property you
claim to own is in. the name. of your son?
A. That is right." (R. 477).
Mrs. Molinari or Pelligrini then sta.ted that she had title
to real property in the name of Anthony Molinari and Thomas
Pelligrini. Mrs. Molinari could not. recall any information con.~erning her contacts with the relatives of her former husband
whatsoever (R. 482). She admitted that she had not been
in touch with any of her own relatives (R. 485). For a period

14
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of several years none of her relatives even knew of her address (R. 486, 487). She herself had never made any effort
to find out \Yhat had happened to her father's property at
Vetal,·South Dakota ( R. 48 7) . She did not recall ever having
had a social security number (R. 492). Despite the fact that
she testified she was doing business for herself and had a
telephone HOgden Courts Cleaners," she had never identified
herself by filing any affidavit of assumed name or similar
affidavit in or around Chicago (R. 492). She had never had
a telephone listed in the name of .that business in Chicago (R.·
492, 493). ·As far as she knew at the time of the trial spe
had never had a telephone listed in her name in any telephone
directory (R. 493, 494). At the time of her deposition she
stated definitely that she had not had a telephone listing in
the telephone book in her own name (R. 494). She ·has
· never owned an automobile (R. 496). She · could not ever
remember having a dri~er's license (R. 495, 496). Later she
stated that in 193 3 or 1934, when she was in California, she
had a driv:er's license under the name of nPelligrini" (R. 497).
She did obtain a driver's lic~nse on July 19, 1950, but she
could not remember whether Cox and Company, nMissing
Heir" investigators, who allegedly turned up the purported
heirs, had anything to do with that (R. 498). In Chicago she
voted since 19~17 under the name of nPelligrini" (R. 499)
Certainly it is not difficult to understand why any of the
searches made for a person under the name nMildred Molinari" were not successful; in fact, it appears that it would almost have been an impossibility for one to find her in a city
the size of Chicago under the conditions and circumstances
15
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in which she lived. If she had purposely cut herself off from
all of her friends and relatives, and particularly from her
father and his interests, it is difficult to imagine how she
could have done a more complete job.
During all of the probate proceedings tn the Charles
Carson estate the only name that anyone suggested as to the
purported son of Charles. Carson was R. V. Till~r and Robert
V. or R. V. Swann. The plaintiff in this action was interrogated concerning his activities and the names which he haq
used since approximately _1926 or 1927. During all of that
peri~d of time he was unable. to point out one instance where
any ·other name was used than Robert or Robert V. or R. V.
Tillier. Exhibit A, a series of drivers' licenses and renewals
for the .years 1947, 48, 59 and 50, authorizing the owner
of the · license to operate a public conveyance in the City of
Chicago, all referred to Robert Tillier .. Exhibit B, which was
a series of
City of Chicago Vehicle Licenses ·for the years
.
1947, 48 and ·49 all .referred to Robert V. Tillier at 4707
Kenmore Avenue, Chicago.
.

Exhibit C, which is a series of chauffeur's licenses for
the State of Illinois, for the years 1946, 1945, 1948, .1945,
1942 refer to Robert Tillier at 4707 Kenmore Avenue, Chicago, and 45_39 :North Racine Avenue, Chicago~ ..
Exhibit D, which likewise is a series of drivers' or chauffeur's licenses for the State of Illinois for the years 1939, ·
1940 and 194i, refer to Robert Tillier at 607 Oakdale Avenue,
648 Oakdale Avenue and 1647 South California Avenue, .all
in Chicago.
. 16
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This plaintiff \vas registered as a voter under the name of
Robert Tillier (Ex. E).
Exihbit F indicates that he was employed by Thompson's
Restaurants as Robert Tillier.
. Exhibit G indicates that his telephone notices came to
Robert V. Tillier.
Exhibit H shows that his rent was paid under the name
of Robert V. T illier.
Exhibit I indicates that his light bills ·were paid under
the name Robert T illier.
Exhibit
V. Tillier.

J indicates

that his gas bills were paid as Robert

Exhibit K shows thaf his income tax returns were paid
under the name Robert Tillier.
Exhibit L indicates that in· the year 1946, while in California, he went under the name Robert Victor Tillier.
The fact in this regard is that the plaintiff admitt.ed that
he had used the name Tillier at all times for all purposes since
1926 or 1927. At no place where plaintiff used a name did
he use the name ((Tiller" or the name uSwann."
17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~e too had lost contact with all of his relatives and any

friends of the family which existed in Vetal, South Dakota,
or Chicago or any other place prior to approximately ,1925
or 1926. He was a transient most of. his life, going from state
to state; couldn't remember most of the time where he was
during a given period. He claims he changed his name about
1923-6.
nWhy did you change your name from Swann to Tillier ?"
nl wanted to go back to the family name."
((Why not Tiller then?"
Ctl liked the sound of Tillier. Only reason." He had never
made any effort to locate his ·father except that one letter was
sent to the county recorder at Martin, South Dakota, in or
about the year 1947 or 1938 . to determine if his father still
owned sotne property (R.265-267). He testified that he knew
of the \vhereabouts of his sister during the greater part of
this periqd of time, but it is very apparent from his testimony
that he ·had most certainly failed to· keep any connections of
his former associations. Again, if an effort had been knowingly made to cut himself off from all former relatives, friends
and acquaintances, a more complete job could hardly have been
imagined or planned than was done by the plaintiff in this
action .
\

.

.

;

.Condensing the claims of plaintiffs against Norton, as
the same appear in Paragrauph 12 of the Second Amended
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Complaint, the plaintiffs, right to recover is based upon the
following claimed acts of fraud:
1. That Norton knew at the time he consented to be the

nominee of the widow Grace Catherine Carson, (a) that
plaintiffs were the heirs of Carson and. were living in Chicago,
Illinois; (b) that Grace Catherine Carson was not the widow
of the deceased and (c) the publishing of notice to creditors
on June 24th through July 15, 1949, subsequent to the order
signed by the Court but prior to the entry of Fidings and Conclusions for such order.
2. In doing of the folowing acts as administrator: (a) in
not publishing a legal notice to heirs or creditors in the es·tate; (b) in filing two petitions for a widow's allowance;
(c) in failing after July 22, -1949, to mail notices to the plaintiffs; (d) in failing- to make a diligent search for plaintiffs;
(e) in failing to inventory certain assets.
3. In failing to reveal to the Court, (a) that he knew
plaintiffs were the children of deceased; (b) that Grace Catherine Carson was not the widow; (c) the facts as to what
search he had made to locate the plaintiffs.
During the course of the trial, however, it became apparent to the Court and counsel, in view of the authorities
on this matter and of the circumstances involved, that any
irregularities in the time of the various orders and actions
taken by the administrator would not be grounds for setting
the decree aside for extrinsic fraud. The real claim in this
action boiled down to the proposition that the administrator
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had not affirmatively given the location and identity of these
two children to the Court. This appeared clearly from a discussion of certain rulings of the Court (R.- 434, 43 5).
''THE COURT: Let us inquire into this. There seems
to be a lot of argument. I thought we had settled our
positions before.
Mr. Beatie, the basis of your claim here is that the
decree of distribution, and all proceedings, was based
on the fraud of the administrator in affirmatively hiding the location and identity of these children.
J\.fr. Beatie: From the Court. Yes.
The Court: If you fail in thatMr. Beatie: I fail completely.
The Court: Then your decree is res ad judicata and
there might have been an injustice but no remedy.
Mr. Beatie: That is right."
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, and after the defendants had made their motions to dismiss upon the ground
that no such proof had been adduced by plaintiffs, the Court
stated:
'(Now as I understand it, the administrator is under
a very great duty to disclose to the court, at the time distribution is made, all known facts relative to heirship,
and in those cases where the administrator himself actually receives, either directly or indirectly, benefits of
the estate and the heir does not show up, after his
failure to use reasonable diligence to locate them, does
constitute what can be considered fraud upon that particular heir.
20
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nWhat do you claim in this case, Mr. Norton knew
or did affirmatively that constituted the fraud?
ttDo you clain1 that the evidence shows that he had
any know ledge of the whereabouts of these children
that he did not disclose?
MR. BEATIE: To that question, no."
It was clearly made to appear by the record, therefore,
that plaintiffs were forced to abandon any claim based· on
irregularities in the probate decision. In fact, plaintiffs had
conceded that the Court had jurisdiction in the probate pro- .
ceedings (R. 145). It also appears that plaintiffs had abandoned their claim that the administrator had failed to disclose
to the Court any knowledge he had concerning the plaintiffs
or the rights or position of the widow Grace Catherine Carson.
While fraud was the entire basis of the right of plaintiff~ to
recover in this action, both in the pleadings and by the admission of plaintiffs' counsel during the course of the presentation of plaintiffs' evidence, and at the conclusion of
the evidence in direct response to the question, that the
administrator :ttad not failed to disclose any knowledge he
had to the Court. The entire basis for fraud was thus abandoned by the plaintiffs.
There remained only the question, then, as to whether
the administrator, under the complaints and issues, was guilty
of fraud in not making a further search or in not applying to
the Court for further instruction after Judge Jeppson had made
and entered his finding that the only known heir was Grace
.Catherine Carson, and having further found that Grace Cath21
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thine Carson was the widow of the deceased. In this connec
tion, it must be recalled that there had been a very hotly con·
tested series of court proceedings extending over a period
in excess of nine months concerning directly the question as
to whether there were children, as to their existence, their
probable location and also as to the validity of the position
of Grace Catherine Carson as the widow of the deceased.
4

In connection with this point Judge Lewis stated (R.
151):
no£ course, in looking in retrospect that is what
should have been done." (Making of an application
to the court for direction as to whether there should
be a further search.) There is no question about that.
These children are here at this stage of the proceed·
ings. Of course, as the case goes forward they may
have some evidence to the contrary. At this. stage of
the proceeding it is ut:Idoubtedly true that the court
at that time abused its discretion in closing the estate,
but the remedy for that was an appeal at that time.
If he just made an error in judgment, that is just too
bad.

Mr. Beatie: That is right."

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT NO. I
THE ADMINISTRATION OF AN ESTATE OF A
DECEASED~ PERSON IS AN ACTION IN REM AND
AFTER THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY LAW THE PRO·
CEEDING IS BINDING UPON ALL THE WORLD AND
22
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UPON 1\LL PERSONS HAVING AN\" CLAIM IN THE
ESTATE.

POINT NO. II
i\. DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION IN A PROBATE PRO-

CEEDING IS A FINAL DETERMINATION, SUBJECT TO
ATTACK ONLY IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING FOR EXTRINSIC FRAUD.

POINT NO. III
NEITHER THE ADMINISTRATOR NOR THE SURETY CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR A MISTAKE OF JUDGMENT IN A DECREE OF THE COURT.
POINT NO. IV
THERE WAS NO PROOF OF EXTRINSIC FRA-UD
IN THE CASE AT BAR. ·
POINT NO. V
THERE WAS NO PROOF IN THE CASE AT BAR
FROM WHICH THE COURT COULD INFER THAT
LOREN G. NORTON, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTl1.TE OF CHARLES CARSON, DID NOT EXERCISE
THE CARE AND PRUDENCE OF A REASONABLY PRUDENT ADMINISTRATOR WITH RESPECT TO THE
MATTER OF GIVING NOTICES AND MAKING ANY
SEARCH FOR THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION.
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ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE ADMINISTRATION OF AN ESTATE OF A
DECEASED PERSON IS AN ACTION IN REM AND
AFTER THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY LAW THE PROCEEDING IS BINDING U-PON ALL THE WORLD AND
UPON ALL PERSONS HAVING ANY CLAIM IN THE
ESTATE.
In Snyder v. Murdock, 26 Utah 233, 73 Pac. 22 (1903)
the Court stated, quoting a California case:
''By filing the petition for the distribution of the
estate and giving the notice required by Section 1665,
Code Civil Procedure, the Superior Court acquired
jurisdiction to distribute the estate 'among the persons
who by law were entitled thereto.' The 'distribution'
of an estate includes the determination of the persons
who by law are entitled thereto, and also the (proportions or parts' to which each of these persons is entitled; * * * * A probate for distribution is in the
nature of a proceeding in rem, the res being
the estate which is in the hands of the executor
under the control of the court, and which he
brings before the court for the purpose of receiving
directions as to its final disposition. By giving the
notice directed by the statute, the entire world is called
before the court, and the court acquires jurisdiction
over all persons for the purpose of determining their .
rights to any portion of- the estate; and every person
who may assert any right or claim therein is required
to present his claim to the court for its determination.
Whether he appear and present his claim, or fail to
appear, the action of the court is equally conclusive
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upon him, subject only to be reversed, set aside or
modified on appeal. A decree is just as binding upon
him if he fail to appear and present his claim as if
his claim, after presentation, had been disallowed
by the court."
In the case at bar it \vas stipulated repeatedly that the
Court in the Estate of Charles Carson, et al., acquired jurisdiction; that notices of the hearing of the petition for letters
of administration had been -given by mailing and posting, as
required by Section 102-2-8, U.C.A. 1943.
In the case of Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac.
522 ( 1909), the Supreme Cnurt of Utah held that this original
notice is the only notice in the proceeding that is jurisdictional.
((The whole question, therefore, hinges upon V{hether
notice of .the hearing on the application for distribution
is essential to give the court jurisdiction. * * * From
the provisions contained in Section 3779 (( (identical
with Sec. 102-2-7, Utah Code Ann. 1943) * * *
'(probate proceedings are deemed to be proceedings
in rem and that the court acquires jusisdiction of the
res-that is-the property of the estate- and all of
the persons who have or claim to have any interest
in the property by the notice required to be given
for the appointment of an administrator or executor
as the case may be. * * * All other notices provided
for, however important they may be, in certain cases
and under certain circumstances, are, nevertheless, not
jurisdictional. * * * When the notice for the appointment of an administrator was given as required by
statute, we think that- the effect of such notice was
to bring all the parties who have or acquired any interest in the estate into court. * * * We think the
more reasonable and safer doctrine is that, when the
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

statutory notice that an administrator will be appointed
is given, such a notice not only is notice to the parties
of the fact, but is notice to all the world, that the
court, by the appointment of an administrator, will
take charge of the property of the deceased to administer it, and that it will finally distribute the remainder,
if any, to the heirs of the deceased."
..

The Court in the Barrette case, supra, held that although
notice had not been given of the hearing on the petition for
distribution, the proper notice had been given of the petition
for the appointment of an administrator, and such notice was
conclusive on all the world. The decree distributing real
property of the estate conveyed good and marketable title, and
the purchaser could not object to. the failure to give notice
of the petition for final distribution of the estate.
These Utah cases state, it is submitted, the universal view
upon the effect of administration of the estate of a deceased.

4i-

In the estate of Charles Carson, deceased, there were actually three petitions filed praying for letters of administration.
The petition of Dr. Howard T. Anderson was filed the day before the funeral, October 11, 1948. Notices of this petition
and the hearing thereof were sent by the deputy county clerk
on the 16th day of October, 1948, to Grace Catherine Sweeney
Carson, 2300 South State Street, Salt Lake County, Utah; R.
V. Swann, Chicago, Illinois; Mrs. Mildred Swann Molinari,
Chicago, Illinois. Copies of the notice were deposited in the
United States Post Office in Salt Lake City, postage prepaid,
to the individuals named (Ex. L-1). Subsequently, in the
course of the various hearings in the estate, a petition was
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filed by D. L. O'Donnell on the 14th day of April, 1949.
Notices of this petition and the hearing thereon were sent
on the 16th day of April, 1949, nby depositing the ·same in
the U. S. Post Office in Salt Lake City, Utah, postage prepaid,
. to the follo"ring named persons and addresses, to-wit: R.
V. Swann, Chicago,· Illinois; Mildred Swann Molinari, Chi-·
cago, Illinois, (Ex. 19). This case was consolidated with
the petitions_by Mrs. Carson and Dr. Anderson for hearing.
It thus appears that the only jurisdictional notice required by the Utah statute was given to the plaintiffs in this
action. It is true. that the notices were sent by the clerk at the
instance _of petitioners other than Mrs. Carson. The fact
remains,. nevertheless, that the petitions were all consolidated
for hearing and the Court did obtain jurisdiction by the giving
of these notices.
Plaintiffs in this action, as heretofore stated, stipulated
on several occasions that the Court obtained jurisdiction in
the probate of the Charles Carson estate. Certainly the mailing of notice to the two plaintiffs under the only names by
which they were known by any of the parties to the probate
proceeding, and to the only addresses which were ~nown to
any of the parties, would not have reached them at any time
ino 1949 or 1948. The fact that the notices apparently did
not reach the plaintiffs is, of course, immaterial in determining 'Yhether the Court obtained jurisdiction of the res and
of the plaintiffs insofar as the probate of the estate is concerned.
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POINT NO. II
A DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION IN A PROBATE PROCEEDING IS A FINAL DETERMINATION, SUBJECT TO
ATrACK ONLY IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING .FOR EXTRINSIC FRAUD.
Benson v. Anderson, 10 Utah 135; 37 Pac. 256, appears
to be the first case in Utah where the question of extrinsic .
. fraud was involved. In that case the plaintiff was an .elderly
Danish woman who had virtually no knowledge of the English
language. She had full and ·complete notice of all the probate proceed~ngs in her husband's estate, but it appeared that
she had depended wholly upon others for information as to
her rights, and she had been misled and defrauded by such
other persons in their representations to her. The Court stated:
'

'

'

''We do not intend to declare that a party .to a
probate proceeding may sit by when an erroneous
decree is entered against him, and negligent!y permit
the time for appeal to expire, arid depend on a bill in·
equity to correct it. But in this case sufficient excuse
is shown for the failure to appeal, and no such neglect
is shown in this case a sought to deprive the plaintiff
of relief."
·
A similar factual situation was presented by the case of
Rice v. Rice, 212 Pac. ( 2d) 685; 182 Pac. ( 2d) 111. In
this. case an heir of an estate attempted to set aside a decree
of the probate court ~hich had been obtained by misrepresentation of the executrix to the heir as to the property being .
distributed to the heir. The Court held that where the. executrix assured the. plaintiff· that he would get· a certain property
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and then distributed the property otherwise in the court proceeding, the. heir had been deprived by such act of his day
in court, and the executrix had been guilty of extrinsic fraud
sufficient to justify the intervention of a court of equity.
Weyant rs. Utah SavingJ & Trust Company, 54 Utah, .
181; 182 Pac. 189, presented a situation where the deceased
abandoned his family in the East and eloped with a seventeenyear old girl to Salt Lake City, where he made his· home.
He was known at his new address for many years as ((Fuller.
On his death the woman with whom he eloped probated his
estate under the name ((Fuller" without revealing the fact
that she was never married to him, and without revealing
his true widow or his children, all of which was fully known .
to her. The girl fraudulently represented to the Court that
she was the widow and in addition she concealed approximately $12,000 of assets which had belonged to the deceased
and should have been inventoried.
n

The Court announced the following legal principles:
(( 1. Probate proceedings are in rem, and _where the

statutory notice has been given, all who are interested
in the estate are bound by all orders or decrees duly
entered in a particular case, and that ordinarily is the
only remedy is by direct appeal.
((2. Judgments and decrees entered by courts of

competent jurisdiction, where jurisdiction of the subject of the action and of the person -has been legally
acquired, can only. be assailed o_n _dire~t appeal or _in
equity for exttinstc .as contradtsttngutshed from tntrinsic fraud."
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It is significant in the Weyant case that the family had
spent considerable money in an attempt to locate their father,
Weyant, and the court found that they had been fraudulently
misled by the knowing and false representations made. to the
court in the petition and testimony of the M<:>rgan woman.
Where the administrator knowingly causes a false and fictitious notice to be published, the Court held that such an
·act amounted to extrinsic fraud and that a .court of equity
would grant relief.

Anderson v. State, 65 Utah, 512, 238 Pac. 557 and Cani. well v. Thatcher Bros. Banking Co., 47. Utah, 150; 151
Pac. 986, are authorities for the proposition that anything less
than extrinsic fraud will not justify the· intervention of an
equity court.
In the Anderson case an attempt was· made to set aside
an adverse judgment in bastardy proceedings. upon the ground
that the judgment was procured by the perjured testimony of
and her mother in the case. In .refusing to set the
the woman
.
judgment aside, the Court announced this. doctrine:
.

'

. ttFirst, the fraud relied upon must be extrinsic, but
not fraud which could have been apprehended in the
trial of the case which resulted in the judgment complained of; second, it sh.ould appear to the satisfaction
of th~ equity tr~l?unal that had· it not been for the
fraud the judgment would not have been rendered;
third, the fraud, and the. effect thereof, should be made
to appear heyo.t;J.d a reasonable doubt; and, fourth,
. the parties seeking the relief must have been free from
negligence of the case in which the judgment was
rendered.''
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In the Cdnt ttcll case plaintiff sought to set aside a decree
which ~'as based upon alleged perjured testimony of the
president of the bank. The Court held that if the witness
committed perjury, the perjury related directly to the subject
matter involved in the detern1ination of the Court in the
former proceeding.
ttl£ we assume, therefore, that the perjury constituted a fraud against the plaintiff, yet it was fraud
which directly arose out of the matter litigated in
the prior action, the case, therefore, clearly is not one
where ~orne alleged fraud was committed which prevented the plaintiff from fully presenting his case, or
where he was deceived or misled, and for those reasons did not make out a case or present his defense,
as the case may be, but the alleged fraud-that is the
perjury-was committed with respect to the things
litigated and which the court adjudicated in the former
action. Under such circumstances the great weight of
authority is to the effect that a court of equity is not
authorized to grant relief.H

The judgment of the district court denying relief to Cantwell was affirmed.
It seems appropriate to invite the Court's attention at
this time to the fact that plaintiff's counsel at various stages
of. the proceeding stated in no uncertain terms that he knew·
he would have to prove extrinsic fraud if relief was to be
obtained in the case at bar. In the course of a discussion as
to certain rulings ot the Court the Court stated:
HLet us inquire into this. There seems to be a lot
of argument. I thought we had settled our positions
before.
""1
)_
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~~Mr. Beatie, the basis of your claim· fhere is the
decree of distribution, and all proceedings was based
o~ .the fraud ~f the administrator in affirmatively
htdtng the locatlon and identity of these children.

Mr. Beatie: I fail completely.
The Court: If you fail in thatMr. Beatie: From the court; yes.
The Court: Then your decree is res adjudicata, and
there might have been an injustice but no remedy.
Mr. Beatie: That is right." (R. 434, 43·5).
The trial of the case at bar was supposedly directed to
the proof of such fraud. Plaintiffs, well knew and stated to
the Court .that extrinsic fraud was the nub of their contention.
That extrinsic fraud must be shown in an action of this
kind is well settled by cases in other jurisdictions. The basic
doctrine of the lJtah cases is founded upon United States v.
Throckmorton} 98 U.S. 61; 25 L. Ed. 93. That case was a land
title action to set aside a judgment twenty years after it had
been entered. The court confirmed the sanctity of judgments
and the fundamental principies to set litigation at rest once
ther~ had been ~ determination, and then sets forth the following circumstances under which relief from a judgment may
be granted in equity:
... where, by reason of something done by the sue. cessful party to· a suit, there was, in fact, no adversary
trial or decisiop. of the issue of the ca.se. Where the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting
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fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him
by his opponent, as by keeping him a'vay from court,
a false promise of a compromise; or where the de·
fendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept
in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
attorney fraudulently or 'vithout authority assumes
to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or
\\·here the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells
out his clienf s interest . . . "
The Court stated as a qualification to the foregoing rule:
t]n all these cases and many others which have been
examined, relief has been granted, on the ground that,
by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, that party
has been prevented from presenting all of his case to
the court.

***

ttequity will not go behind the judgment to
interpose in the case itself, but only when there was
some hindrance besides the negligence ·of the defendant, in presenting the defense in the legal action. * * *
ctNew matter may in· some bases be ground for relief;
but it must not be what was tried before."
POINT NO. III
NEITHER THE ADMINISTRATOR NOR THE SURETY CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR A MISTAKE OF JUDGMENT IN A DECREE OF THE COURT.
Appellants. infer in their brief that the Findings, Conclusions and Decree in the Charles Carson Estate, whereby
33
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the Court determined that Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson
was ~he sole surViving heir of Char!~s Carson, deceased, was
erroneous, and that the Court should not have made such a ·
decree at that stage in the proceedings.
.

if

It will be recalled that up until the time this oral decree
vvas first made on or about June 11,. 1949, and the written
Findings, Conclusions and Decree were signed on or about
July, 22 1949 (Ex. L-1), the questions before the Court were
vvith reference to the granting of petitions for letters of admtntstration. Questions of heirship and widowhood were
necessarily involved in that proceeding because of t~eir bearing upon the priority in the appointment of an administrator.
We do n~t concede that any error or mistake in judgment was
made on the· part of the District Court in connection with. the
tnaking of this order or any other in the Charles Carson
Estate. In view of counsel's. inferences, however, it is suggested to ·the Court that even if som·e error ·or irregularity
occurred, neither the adrilin.istrator nor his bondsmen can be
liable for it in the .subsequent suit which atten1pts in effect to
declare that the administrator is guilty of extrinsic fraud.
Section 102-1-7, U.C.A., 1943~,. provides as follows:
((No order or decree affecting the title to real property, heretofore or. hereafter made in any probate or
guardianship matter, shall be held to be void at. the
suit .or instance of any person claiming adversely to
the title of the decedent or ward, or under a title not
derived from or through the decedent or v1ard, on. account of any want of notice, defect or irregularity in
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the proceedings, or of any defect or irregularity in such
order or decree, if it appears that, before the order
or decree \Yas entered, the executor, administrator or
guardian, as the case may be, \vas appointed by a court
of cotnpetent jurisdiction upon such notice as was or
may be prescribed by law; and in a probate matter
in \Yhich a competent court shall have appointed an
executor, administrator or guardian upon due notice,
no objection to any subsequent order or decree therein
can be taken by any person claiming under the deceased
or under the ward, on account of any such want of
notice, defect or irregt~larity, ·in any other manner
than on direct application to the same court, made at
any time before distribution or on appeal."
In Cook v. Ringer, 244 N.W. 615, (Sup. Ct. Wis., 1932),
it appeared that the probate judge had received a letter at
the time of the hearing on the question of distribution, in
\vhich a claim was made· that there were living children of
the administrator-apparently brothers and sisters of deceased
-who were entitled to share in the estate. The father of the
deceased and administrator of the estate represented to the
Court that he was the sole surviving heir and entitled to receive all of the estate. The probate judge decreed that the
estate should be distributed to the administrator and father.
The plaintiffs brought an action to set aside the finding
and decree and to recover against the bondsmen on the theory
that the bondsmen were liable for a wrongful distribution.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the testimony
of the administrator that he was the sole heir was not extrinsic fraud and that the representation to the Court was a
tnixed question of law and fact. The conclusion of the pro-
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bate judge was undoubtedly erroneous but his error in judgnlent was not because of the failure of the. administrator to
disclose all facts in the administrator's possession. The probate
~udge had all the knowledge of the. claims of purported heirs,
as did the administrator:
~~Consequently,

as no fraud was committed by any
person in connection with the entry of the final decree
on October 21, 1930, it cannot be held that that decree was procure4 by fraud, or that it could be. set
aside because of fraud. That being true, the actu.al
payment by Herman Ringer as administrator to himself in his individual capacity, pursuant to, and in
compliance with, that ·~nal decree, and while it was
in force and effect, constituted proper performance on
his part under the Court's order and judgment, and
was therefore in full compliance with, and not a breach
of, the administrator's bond. * * * That consequence
followed even though the payment was made by Ringer
in his representative capacity to himself in his individual capacity."
This case held:
1 .. Representation of the administrator ·that he was the

sole heir in a petition for distribution was not fraud.
2. The administrator performed properly under the de-·

cree, awarding the proceeds of the estate to himself, even
. though the .administrator knew of the existence of the brothers
and sisters of the deceased.
.

.

3. The mistake in law of a probate .judge could not be
itnputed to the administrator.
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4. There \Yas no liability on the bond because of an error
in judgment by the probate court.
In the case at bar it is undisputed that from the time
of the filing of the first petition on October 11, 1948, until
the time the Court made its determination in the matter,
June 11, 1949, everyone "rho had taken any interest_ whatever
in the proceeding knew that there was a claim made that deceased had t\\'O children whose last known address was Chicago, Illinois. There was also a claim made that Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson was not the lawful wife of Charles
Carson.
All the facts which could be assembled and presented to
the Court concerning these claims were diligently presented
by the special administrator and his counsel. Hearings were
held ~n these very questions on November 26, 1948, December 8,_ 1948, January 19, 1949, January 26, 1949, February
23, 1949, February 26, 1949, March 25, -1949, May 23, 1949,
and June 11, 1949 (Finding of Fact No. 10; R. 147). At
these hearings the efforts that had been made to locate the
purported two children were made apparent in great detail. Sixty to seventy letters were sent to various individuals
and agencies in an effort to find plaintiffs.
The Court found in the instant case that the search included contacting by mail and by telephone all known relatives and friends of deceased in West Virginia, Ohio, Illinois
and South Dakota. Inquiries were directed to chiefs of police
at Chicago and Omaha, Nebraska, and inquiries were made
in medical schools in and around Chicago, because of the be37
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lief that Mrs. Molinari had a son attending one of these schools
(Finding of Fact No. 8; R. 146). The special administrator,
through his trust officer and attorney, inquired into the marital
status of the deceased at great length and reported the results
of these investigations to the Court.
Attorneys for the special administrator were paid $5 50.00
for their services; the special administrator was awarded
$150.96 for expenses in the search, and $100.00 was allowed
to Lawrence Barclay for his services in connection with his
search at the request of the deceased of the alleged children.
At the conclusion of all of this testimony, rightly or
wrongly, the probate judge made and entered an order in
which it was stated that Grace Catherine Carson with the surviving wife of Charles c·arson and the only known heir at
law of Charles Carson (Ex. L-1; see Findings, Decree and
order signed July 22, 1949). All ~f the· proceedings and
all of the evidence that was before the Court at the time
this order was entered were before the Court and a part of the
probate file at all other hearings and determinations made by
the Court to the completion of the proceeding.
How can it now be contended that an administrator who
was admittedly not trained in the law, who had to rely upon
his counsel as to the meaning of the orders of the Court and
their significance and the proper procedure in probate matters
(R. 616, 617), should be held legally liable because it is
now inferred that the Court's order was improper? Norton
was a party to the proceeding up until June 11, 1949; he
was a petitioner for letters of administration, and was making
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cert~in contentions and asking for certain relief in connection

\\'ith that petition. l-Ie properly relied upon the dete~mination
of that date to the effect that he was a successful litigant. Certainly there is nothing wrong or extraordinary about his activities up to that time. Certainly now he cannot be charged
with b~d faith or held liable on the theory that the Court
should not have granted him the relief prayed for.
Nor was the situation any different in this respect at
any subsequent hearing. The probate files are considered by
the lavt as a notice to all the world of their contents. C·ertainly
this Court does not wish to announce the doctrine that the
probate judges themselves, who sit upon the very matters
presented to them by the various petitions and other pleadings, do not have notice of the contents of these files~
It is submitted that the most that can be said about the.
Charles Carson Estate proceedings is that there is a possibility Judge Jeppson made Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law more broad than was necessitated by the demands of
the pleadings at that time. This, however, is at most a mere
irregularity in the pro~ee~ings. . It is certainly not jurisrictional, and it is. certainly not an irregularity for which the
administrator or his bondsmen should be made liable in
damages in this proceeding.
POINT NO. IV
THERE WAS NO PROOF OF EXTRINSIC FRAl_TD
IN THE CASE AT BAR.
The amended complaint and the second amended com39

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaint filed by plaintiffs in this action specify fraud on the
part of Norton in the following particulars:
A. That at the time Mrs. Carson filed her petition for
letters of administration Norton knew that the plaintiffs in
this action were the children ·of the deceased and to his best
information resided in Chicago, Illinois."
t t

B. Th~t Mrs. Carson was not the widow of Charles Carson.
C. That the notice to creditors was improper, having been
given prior to the qualification of the administrator.

D. That no legal notice to the heirs or creditors was
published.

E. That the widow's allowance petitions were false.
F. That no. notices were mailed to plaintiffs after July
22, 1949.

G. That no diligent search was made to locate the plain-

Ill
IJ-.,_.

tiffs.

H. That· $300.00 which he owed the estate was not inventoried or was improperly inventoried.
I. That he knew prior to the de~th of Mrs. Carson that
the plaintiffs were the children of the deceased and were· his
heirs.

J.

That Mrs. Carson was not the widow.
40
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K. That Norton kne,,· of the claim made by other parties to the probate proceeding to the etiect that there were
children and that despite such know ledge he did not disclose
to the court the probability of the existence of heirs and that
he had ulterior motives for so acting (R. 31-32, par. 11, R.
80-82, par. 12).
At the close of plaintiffs, evidence, the various defendants submitted their motions to dismiss the complaints and
action, and the court had occasion to further clarify the position of Mr. Beatie with respect to his claims in the case
and what he considered that the evidence showed. The court·
stated:
CCMr. Beatie, the court is of the opinion you have
undoubtedly made a prima facie showing that the
plaintiffs are in fact the son and daughter of H. F.
Swann and that H. F. Swann is. the same person as
Carson, who died here, and that had the two children
been located or had appeared at the original probate
they would have received a share of the estate. Your
evidence is sufficient in that regard, and, of course,
the evidence is clear that they did not receive it. They
v;ere living in Chicago, apparently, under your evidence, at the time of the proceedings, 1:1nder the name
of Tillier and Molinari. The Molinari name was knownat that time.
Now your case, as I understand it, has been based
upon the claim that Mr. Norton, as administrator, was
guilty of fraud, allowing a distribution of the estate
under the circumstances that the evidence discloses here.
Now, as I understand it, the administrator is under
a yery great duty to disclose to the court, at the time
distribution is made, all known facts relative to heir41
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ship, and in those cases where the administrator himself actually receives, either directly or indirectly, the
benefits of the estate when the heir doesn't show up,
that his failure to use reasonable diligence to locate
them does constitute, or can be considered a fraud
upon that particular heir.
What do you claim in this case Mr. Norton knew,
or did affirmatively, that constituted a fraud?
Do you claim that the evidence shows that he had
any knowledge of the whereabouts of these children,
that he did not disclose?"
Mr. Beatie: To that question, no.
The Court: Do you claim that he .did anything affirmatively to prevent the discovery of the whereabouts
of these children ?
Mr. Beatie: Yes, with reference to that. An affirmative act which is negatively operated . in failing to
make any investigation by which he. could inform the
court the result of his investigation.
The Court: He answered and testified here that he
did nothing, after he was appointed administrator, affirmatively, to locate these children; that he knew of
the prior inquiries. of yourself and Tracy's; and the
effect of his testimony was that, at least as I interpreted
it, that he believed he could do nothing further.
Mr. Beatie: That is correct.
The Court: It is your position, isn't it, it was. his
duty to do something further, and, in the absence of
doing it, that constituted fraud? What should he
have done?
42
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Mr. Beatie: He should have at least made some independent investigation upon ~is own.
He should have, during the lifetime of Mrs. Carson,
determined what she knew with reference to it; she
being the prime mover by which he became administrator of the estate, to determine from her actually
whether she knew anything with reference to these
children.
·
The Court: Is there any evidence ·.to the effect he
did not do that, that he didn't make inquiry from
~rs. Carson; or is there any evidence to show if he
had made inquiry from Mrs. Carson, it would have
done any good?
Mr. Beatie: No direct evidence, Your Honor. It all
has to be inferred evidence, at least as we adopted the
petitions have been filed by both he .and Mrs. Carson
with reference to (~ases 30762 and 30771. Those are
the two, No. 30761 and 30762 ~ . · .
. The Court: My question was whether he had done
anything affirmatively, to prevent discovery. ThaJ~ of
course, would constitute a fraud, if he did anything
like that.
Is there anything else in regard to the actions of
Mr. Norton that you claim constituted fraud, except
his failure to make any in<)uiry under the circumstances?
Mr. Beatie: Yes. I claim this: That Mrs. Carson,
having knowledge of the fact at the time of the filing
of her petition, was under the duty, under the stat~te,
to disclose to the court the names of any known hetrs,
which she has not done in anywise; that in ·conjunction
with the appointment of Mr. Norton as her appointee,
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that he failed in his duty to then further require an
amendment to my petition, to inform the court that
there might be heirs, and ask then that money be designated from the estate to make such search or to disclose to the court what search he had made; in which
event the court, undoubted! y-·as I will be able to show
by cases-.undoubtedly would have made such an order.

* * * * *
The Court: Of course, in looking it?- retrospect that
is what should have been done. There is no question
about that. 1·hese children are here at this stage of
the proceedings. Of course, as the case goes forward
they may have some evidence to the contrary. At this
stage of the proceedings it is undoubtedly. true that
that court at that time abused its discretion, in closing
the estate. But the remedy for that was an appeal at
that time. If he just made an error in judgment, that
is just too bad.
Mr. Beatie: That is right."
The court then pointed out that the only way relief could
be granted is by showing fraud (R .. 75 3-756).
The court then asked Mr. Beatie:
((Assuming that you have shown a prima facie case
of fraud, what do you claim relative to this no marriage
betWeen the Carsons? Isn't that just a bunch of inferences ? The burden is on you to establish now and
negative it.· There is a finding that they were married.
Have you done anything except give me some information· from which I may have a suspicion? Is there
anything I can .base a finding on ?
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Mr. Beatie: Yes.
The Court: What?
Mr. Beatie:· The exhibit which is an exemplified
certified copy of the divorce decree as between Maydie
Tiller and R. C. Tiller, in December·. of 1924, at Chicago. That is the -point at which there would be no
liability, no further liability upon Mr. Tiller to enter
into a marriage contract." (R. 756).
The court was then advised in further detail that the plaintiffs
relied upon an aleged deposition in the Charles Carson estate in which Mrs. Carson supposedly stated that she had
been married to Mr. Carson from 25 to 35 years before
the taking of her deposition. The plaintiffs' position was that
as a matter _of mathematical _deduction she could not have
been married that long because Mr. Tiller was under a disability since the divorce from Mrs. Tiller was not complete at
that time (R. 756-758).
To .be successful, the plaintiffs' proof of fraud in this
action must rise to an exacting standard: · The defendant
Norton must have known of the existence of other heirs and
for the purpose of defrauding such heirs and benefitting him. self must have .f~iled to notify the Court of the existence of
such heirs, and must have knowingly filed false petitions with
the court, representing that there were no such heirs. In such
a case he would be guilty of extrinsic fraud. See _Hewett et al.
vs. Linstead et al.~ 122 Pac. (2d) 355 (D.C. of App. 1st Dis.,
Div. 1, Cal. 1942) and cases cited. The Court stated in this
case that a different rule would be nin effect to hold that an
administratrix is under a positive. duty at her peril to discover
45
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the existence of possible heirs of whose existence she has no
reason or ground to respect." As to determination of widowhood of Grace Catherine Carson, plaintiffs in this action have
the burden of overcoming the presumption of the lawfulness
and validity of ~he second marriage .as this Court has recently
passed upon that subject in H. E. Anderson v. Alvira Magdaline Anderson, No. 7693, decided ____.____________________ ,____________ Pac.
( 2d) ----· The plaintiffs' proof does not even begin to approach
these standards.
Plaintiffs' cases, which are quoted in their brief, are
not in point to the facts of this case. There is no case which
plaintiffs cite,. and we submit no case in existence which holds
that an administrator owes any duty to disclose to the court
that which· the court already knows.. When a court gets· a
probate file in which it appears . from the file itself that
there has been a long standing dispute as to questions of heirship and whether a woman is the surviving widow and a determination is made. on those questions, it certainly can
hardly be contended that the administrator has to disclose
the fact of the controversies in the petition which he files ·to
the court which has determined these matters. That is precisely what the plaintiffs cQntend in this case·.
The cases which. they cite are not relevant to the factual
situation. The case at bar is distinguished, and should be distinguished from the cases cited by plaintiffs and appellants in
this respect: In the case at bar the administrator disclosed
all the facts in his possession to the court at ·all times and
findings, conclusions and decree were made, wherein the court
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found that Grace Catherine Carson was the sole surviving heir
and the widow of the deceased. Before that time, the administrator was one of several persons presenting adverse
claims to the court. At no time did the administrator make any
statements of fact or representations to the effect that there
were no heirs. Norton has simply stood by while the other
parties to the law suit attempted to convince the court that
there were heirs and that Mrs. Carson was not the widow.
Norton had knowledge of all of the claims made to that
time. Neither he nor Mrs. Carson made objections to the
proceedings or hindered the efforts made to locate the heirs.
The court then made its order that Mrs. Carson was the widow
and there were no other known. heirs. Norton's counsel, as
well as Norton, presented no petitions to the court contrary
to this determination. Norton's counsel incorporated the findings of the court into written form and the court adopted
them. The effect of this proceeding was the determination
of heirship under the Utah Statute. It bound all parties to
the proceeding. It was accomplished in conformity with the
provisions of the Utah Statute relating to this very subject.
True, it may have been that the court did not have to find
and determine that Mrs. Carson was the sole surviving heir_
at that time, but in view of the contentions made as to purported children, the court did, nevertheless, make that finding and conclusion, and at subsequent stages of the proceeding
this determination was reiterated. Now, the question in this
case is whether without any new or different knowledge of
plaintiffs, the administrator, having adopted the finding of
the court in the contested matters in his subsequent petition, was guilty of any extrinsic fraud. Certainly, the
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cases cited by the appellants do not sustain the position that
he was. Let~ us examine appellants' case with reference to
this proposition .. ·Let us first consider the Utah cases appellants cite.
In re Pilcher's Estate, 114 Ut. 72, .197 Pac. 2d 143;, ( 1948),
is cited by appellants at page 44 of their brief. In this case,
the deceased married Mabel Vaughn Pilcher in Lyon County,
Kansas in 1901. They lived as husband and wife for several
years in Kansas where six cildren were born, four of whom
were living at the time of the trial. These parties separated
in 1925. Thereafter the parties were in contact with each
other to some extent, according to Mabel Vaughn Pilcher,
on cross examination, and he . told her that he had
divorced her. In 1926, apparently in reliance upon the statements of deceased, Mabel Vaughn Pilcher began living with
one Hal F. Showers, ostensibly as his wife, although she
denied at the trial thaf she was his wife. The decedent and
Mildred Pilcher were married on June 26, 1941, at Logan.
Mildred \vas 19 and he was 59 at the time. Mildred testified
that he told her he had not been married but she discovered
his · prior marriage about a month after their marriage and
she was assured that he had obtained a divorce. Thereafter,
for some time, Mildred· and the deceased lived in California
as husband and wife. There was testimony that the deceased
had told Mabel Vaughn Pilcher, while he was tiving with
Mildred in California; that he had not divorced her. When
Pilcher died, Mildred filed a petition for and was granted
letters of administration. During the course of administration,
Lee Brown, who was the son of Mabel and William Pilcher,
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came to Mildred purporting to represent all the children of
Mabel and William and insisted upon a settlement with her
on behalf of the children. Mildred paid to him the sum of
$3,000 and certain personal property belonging to the deceased. lvfildred proceeded to administer the estate and notices were sent to the named heirs. Thereafter, Mabel filed
an ttobjection to final account in petition for distribution"
and also served and filed a ttpetition for removal of administratrix and for letters of administration.'' The lower court
found for the contestant and by its decree revoked and cancelled letters that had been issued to Mildred. She prosecuted
the appeal. The court set aside the judgment of the lower
court and remanded the case on the theory th~t the contestant
below did not prove with clear and convincing evidence that
the second marriage was invalid and the first divorce of no
effect. The court cited opinions from a number of jurisdictions to the effect that the second marriage is clothed with
every presumption of validity and that the law presumes
innocence, not guilt, morality, .not· immorality, marriage, not
concubinage.
This Court has very recently added weight to the
already established proposition that the second marriage is
clearly presumed to be valid. H. A. Anderson v. Elvira Magdaline Anderson, No. 7693, ____ P 2d ----a It appears that the
respondent in that case attacked their marriage there with the
same kind of evidence relied upon by appellants here.
Mr. Justice Wade wrote a separate concurring opinion. in
the Pilcher case, supra, in which he discussed in detail the significance of the presumption that the marriage was valid. He
concluded:
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((In other words, it it judicially deemed socially desirable that ·where a marriage ceremony consummated
by cohabitation is shown, an innocent person shall not
be branded as having lived in unlawful cohabitation
or ~nnocent children be branded as illegitimate, even
though if the truth were proved, such would be the
case. To avoid such hardships on innocent persons
the courts have created a barrier against such results
by creating a presumption in favor of a lawful marriage, which presumption is not overcome by satisfying the o~dinary burden of persuasion. Such a presumption persists until it is overcome by clear, convincing and conclusive evidence. See aut~orities quoted
in the main opiinon. I agree that such is the correct
policy of the law." (Emphasis by the court). (See particularly Pages 153, 154, Pacific Reporter.)
It is difficult to see that plaintiffs and appellants are
benefitted 9Y this opinion. The necessity of disproving or
overcoming the presumption . of legitimacy of marriage is
emphatically upheld. In the case at bar it is submitted that
this presumption was not met even if the question of widowhood was not res adjudicata in the probate proceeding. Certainly the Pilchers Estate does not add any force to the proposition that Norton and/or Mrs. Carson were guilty of fraud
in the Charles Carson estate.
In Rice v. Rice, ____ Utah ____ , ~12 Pac. (2d) 685, (1949)
an executor not only misconstrued the amount of a legacy and
the construction of a will .to the court in her petition for distribution, but also the executrix denied to her brother the opportunjty of a hearing on a matter which the court said that
she must have known to have been in dispute~ The Court
held that under the circumstances of the case, in view of the
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dispute v.rhich the executrix knew would exist if her interpretation of the 'vill \vas correct, the affirmative lack of
candor in presenting the matter for the determination of the
Court constituted extrinsic fraud.,
In the case at bar the very fact which the plaintiffs seek
to have relitigated was in fact determined after a contest in
the probate court. The plaintiffs' counsel admitted that the
administrator had, not withheld any information from the
Court, and that the Court was not prevented from passing upon
- the subject matter and the issues which plaintiffs new seek
to have litigated. Certainly there is a broad line of demarcation
between the principles applicable to the facts of the Rice case
which r.oerely affirmed the fundamental doctrine announced in
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61; 25 L. Ed. 93, and
our case, where the administrator in fact relied upon a judgment of the court which passed upon the very questions in
dispute.
In re Pingree's Estate, 82 Utah 437, 25 Pac. (2d) 937,
(1933), cited by appellants at Page 51 of their brief, ha~ no
bearing upon the facts in this case. It is. true that the Court
there stated that the special administratrix had a special duty
to preserve property until a general administrator was appointed. However, the facts there have no application to
the problems in the case at bar, and the case is not in point
in any particular whatever. In the case at bar the fact is that
the special administrator, whether it had such a duty or not,
Yvhether it was empowered or not, made a very thorough and
complete search for the plaintiffs in this action. That search
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was made by one in privity with the general administrator as
stated in the Pingree case.
It is submitted that tlie Pingree case does not add. any
strength whatever to appellant's position here.
Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Co.} 54 Utah 181; 182
Pac. 189 ( 1919) stands upon .its own facts and is certainly
not authority for the proposition appellants contend , for in
the case at bar. There the husband eloped with another
woman and lived a fictitious name. When at his death she
secured letters of administration and probated the estate under
a representation that she was his wife, it was held that a
court of equity had jurisdiction to set aside the proceeding
on the ground that the notice required by the Utah Statute
was not given. The Court stated:

ttThis court is committed to the doctrine contended
for by counsel for appellant, viz:. that probate pro. ceedings are in rem and that where the statutory notice
has been given, all who are interested in the estate
are bound by all orders and decrees entered in a particular case and that ordinarily the only remedy is by
direct appeal."
The court held that since none of the notices were given
in the deceased's name, and since the entire proceeding was
conducted with a view to preventing the known children and
wife of the deceased from having the hearing, the Court was
justified in setting t~e entire proceeding aside and the distribution aside on· the ground of extrinsic fraud. Certainly
there can be no quarrel with such a decision with reference to
the facts involved.
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As heretofore stated, however, in the case at bar there
\vas no failure to disclose, there was no probate in an improper name, there was no lack of good faith on the part of
the administrator. Instead of there being an effort to conceal from the Court the name of the deceased and all of
the appropriate circumstances, all of these matters were placed
before the court in an extensive proceeding lasting nine months.
Certain!y the facts in the Weyant case distinguish it from the
principles applicable in the case at bar.
Barfette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574; 106 Pac. 522 (1909)
certainly does not add any strength to appellants' argument.
The Court there affirmed positions taken in prior Utah cases
that probate proceedings are in their nature proceedings in
rem. The Court .held that when a petition for letters o( ad- '
ministration is filed and the notice is given by mailing and
posting, as provided by the Utah statute, the whole world is
brought before the Court. The Court stated that subsequent
notices ({however important they may be in certain cases and
under certain circumstances, are nevertheless not jurisdic-.
tional; that is, are not made essential conferring power upon
the court to act and hence to disregard them would constitute
a mere irregularity which would have to be assailed and corrected in a direct proceeding, and, if not so attacked, in the
absence of fraud, would be conclusive as to all the world."

This case is discussed in detail elsewhere in this bdef
(Page 24). It is submitted that nothing in this case lends any
support to the appellants' assertion that the administrator was
guilty of fraud in the case at bar.
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Appellants cite Child et al. v. District Court of the Second
Judicial District, et al., 80 Utah 243; 14 Pac.

(2d) 1110

( 1932) for the proposition that an heir is entitled to notice
of proceedings in a probate of an estate. Of course, this
proposition if stated in the abstract is not deniable. However,
there is nothing in this case that lends any support to the
view of appellants as far as the facts in the case at bar are
concerned. In the Child case the Court stated that a probate
Court had jurisdiction to determine a _question of heirship
at any time during the probate proceeding, and that was true
before the time for final distribution. This case certainly is
contrary to the view of appellants with respect to the propriety
of the Findings, C·onclusions and Decree entered by Judge
Jeppson in the Charles Carson Estate on or about July 22,
1949, and the oral order made by Judge Jeppson on or about
June lOth. Counsel in that case stated their proposition to be
that ((there is no occasion for the determination of heirship
until the time for distribution * * * unless there is some
action to be taken in the distribution of the estate which
may adversely affect the heirs' interest." The Court found,
however, that nthe ·jurisdiction to determine heirship is inherent in the probate court to protect the interests of all the
heirs. Where the court is given general jurisdiction, and no
limitation is -placed on its exercise, it must be that it is given
such power to properly discharge its general duty. The probate court is required to distribute the estate; it must require
proof and it must determine questions of sale and mortgage
of property, .and pass on the right to family allowance. If
at any stage of the proceedings the Court, in order to properly
discharge its general duty as a court of probate, should de54
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termine the question of heirship, in the absence of a statutory
limitation on its right to do so, this court will not prohibit
its free determination of that question., .
It is again pointed out to the c·ourt that in the case .at
bar counsel have expressly stipulated that the Court obtained
jurisdiction of the Charles Carson Estate in the probate proceeding for that purpose. It was expressly stipulated, .moreover, that proper notices were given on the petition for letters
of administration and of the hearings pertment to the determination of questions involved in the conflicting petitions.
Cer~ainly Exhibit L~2 is explicit on th~t subject.
All of the notice which the law requires was. given to
the plaintiffs in this action. It ·is. submitted that the Child
case does not add any stature to their position. .
At Page 79 of their brief appellants quote.from In Re Stevens' Estate, 102 Utah 255, 130 Pac. (~d) 85 (1942), where.the
Court quoted from the case of In Re Listm·an's Estate, 57 Utah,
471, 197 Pac. 596, 660 ( 1921). · The appellants, however,
apparently failed to take into account in their citation .of the
case the last sentence quoted, to-wit: ((He" (the administrator)
((is not an insurer, and if he exercises ·ordinary care and .diligence in the performance of his duties, he may not be held
for a mistake or error in judgment." In that case the court
stated that. the administrator rnade a reasonable attempt to
.prevent the sale of certain stock. He acted reasonably and
prudently in the light of the circumstances which then existed,
and in view of that fact the decree of the lower court settling
the account was approved. Certainly we subscribe to the
question of law announced by the court in that case.
55
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In the case at bar Norton knew of the long s.earch· made
by at least two lawyers, .one trust officer and the deceased
himself, comprising not less than sixty or seventy letters and
involving one or more trips to the east to locate the children
of Charles Carson. Norton further knew that all of the facts
and proceedings before the Court had disclosed these searches .
in great detail. He knew that based upon all of the evidence
the Court had made a finding and decree in ·a controversy
involving the very question that Mrs. Carson was the sole surviving widow and the only known heir of Charles Carson. If
acting upon this kf?.owledge and this determination of the Court
is negligence, then certainly. Norton was negligent in this
case. However, it may be assumed that under these circumstances the appellants could have produced evidence of what
the standard of care is which a reasonably prudent man would
have followed. Not only did appellants fail to produce and
prove such a standard, but we submit that no such standard
exists under the facts and circumstances of this case. Norton
did act as a reasonable and prudent man in relying upon the
order of the Court. He is not an insurer.
It is submitted that the Stevens Estate case does not help
the appellants in the case at bar. ~
The cases· cited by appellants under their· Point No. IV
from jurisdictions other than . the State of Utah are also
authority for a proposition not involved in the case at bar.
None of them are in point.
In Hewett, et al.J vs. Linstead, ,et al.J 122 P (2d) 352,
(Dist. Ct. of App., 1942) erroneously cited by appellant as
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122 P. 352, the petit~oner filed false petlttons alleging
that there were no other heirs when he knew that there
were, in fact, living heirs of the deceased. In Larrabee vs.
Tracy, et al. (Sup. Ct. of Calif. 1943, 134 Pac. 2d 265 ), the
executor led the daughter of the deceased legatee, who resided outside of the state, to believe that she would receive ·
a share of the estate and he did not inform her that the execu:tor would dispute the daughter's right to share in it. He further -lead her to believe that the distribution would be made
as soot;1 as a fair P!ice could be obtained for certain real property in the estate.· Correspondence covered a period of five
years and the appellant never, ·at any time, indicated there was
any question about respondent's right to be substituted in her
mother's place~ Of course, the court held under· these cir- ~
cumstances that the failure to permit the ·claim to be litigated
amounted to extrinsic fraud.· Certainly this is not the situation before the court in the case at bar.
In Purinton vs. Dyson, 65 Pac. 2d 777, (Sup. Ct. of Calif.
193 7, the court found that the executor filed his petition
for probate of t~e .deceased's will at a time when he knew
that the respondent was the granddaughter of the deceased;
that she was residing· in Los· Angeles; and that his ·failure to.
disclose her existence was for the purpose of defrauding.
respondent out of her share of the estate. The executor then
suppressed all information which he had from the court and
represented Thomas Purinton to be the only son of the deceased. Under these circumstances the Cali~ornia court, of
course, held that the executor was guilty of extrinsic fraud
because his act of omission and prevented resspondetns from
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being heard. In the case at bar there is an express finding of
the court and an admission by plaintiffs' counsel at the trial
that the administrator and all persons in privity with him
did not fail to disclose to the court any fact in their possession.
Jn Caulk} et al vs. Lowe} et alJ. 178 Pac. 101 (Sup. Ct.
of Okla. 1918) the administratrix represented that she was
the sole heir of the deceased at a time when she knew that
there was a living daughter of the deceased and it appears
that the admi.nistratrix' nominee knew that the daughter was a
non-resident of the State of Oklahoma. The court held that
the fa~lure of the administratrix, who was nominee of Fannie
M. Caulk, to give the notice prescribed by the Oklahoma
Statute rendered the probate void and that the representation
in view of the knowledge of Mary C. Lowe was extrinsic
fraud. Under the circumstances the. court held that she was
bound to disclose her know ledge to the court. It· is submitted ·
that these facts are not the facts before the court in the case
at bar.
In Jorgensen v. Jorgensen} 193 Pac. 2d 728, Sup. Ct.
of Calif. 1948) the husband had not only concealed certain
assets from his wife and the court at the time a property settlemen agreement was made and approved by the court but
he had misrepresented the amount of property at the· time
that the settlement was entered into. The court stated that
the husband was the manager of community property under
the California Statute arid that as such he occupied a fiduciary
relationship· to his wife and was bound to disclose to her in
good faith all of the property at the .time of a settlement of
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this kind (Pac. Rep. p. 733). The court stated that his vio-·
lation of duty prevented the wife from a fair opportunity to
submit her case fully to the court and that there was, therefore, extrinsic fraud from which the court of equity would
grant relief. Certainly, this case is distinguishable on ·the facts.
Crow 'VS. lviadsen, 111 Pac. 2d 7, (Dist. Ct. of App. 4th
Dist. Calif. 1941), must also be distinguished from the case
at _bar. There the executor did not report, inventory, or
account for four parcels of real property and various J?ersonal
property which belonged to the d~eased at the time of her
death. Instead, the_ executors attempted to claim title through
an assignment and purported deed from the decease~. Plaintiffs asserted that the ·purported deed and assignment was
never executed and ·that it was never delivered; that it was
without consideration and that there was · no intention to
make a gift. The Court held that this action, which was all
taken-by ·the executor with knowledge of the facts and knowledge of the untruthfulness of the. petitions and other documents filed with the court, constituted extrinsic fraud and
justified the intervention of a court of equity..

·B1:1t here again there was an affirmative representation
to the court at a time when the executor _had knowledge that
the representations made were untrue. As applied to the
facts this is undoubtedly good law, but how can it be cited
as· competent authority for th-e question before this court?
In Anderson v. Lyons, 32 N. ·w~ (2d) 849 (Sup. Ct.
of Minn.; 1948) the executor knowingly and inte~tionally
concealed from the cour~ the existence of the plaintiff, who
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was apparently a nephew of the deceased, thereby preventing
him from making any claim in the estate. ·It appears from
the discussion of the C'Ourt on Page 850 that the executor
not only knew the name of plaintiff but also his place of
residence. The Court said that failure to make the disclosure
was fraud. We agree. How can this be authority for the .
case at bar?
In Hewitt v. Hewitt} 17 Fed. (2d) 916, (9 C. C. A.
1927) ,the administratrix knew that her husband had an adopted
son; she knew that the husband had made provisions for the
son as late as 1920, thus indicating that the husband did
not believe in the reported death of the son. She made no
inquiry for the son at his last known place .of address or elsewhere, and she knew that the court had no knowledge of the
existence of the son. The son in this case had caused a telephone call· to be made to Los Angeles about seven months
after the death of Hewitt and the woman· who answered the
'phone stated that Hewitt lived there but was out of town
for about two weeks... While it did not appear who answered
the telephone, the Court' obviously gave consideration to
the fact that the son had been in touch with the whereabouts
of Hewitt for some time and had employed attorneys to
obtain infor~ation as to whether .he was living or dead.
..

There is nothing in this case to in any way indicate or
infer that if the Court had had the same knowledge that
the administratrix did, that if a search had been conducted
under the direction of the C'ourt for .a period of nine months
in the probate of the' very estate in question, that the Court
would have held that fail~re to make any further search or
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to disclose the existence of the claim that plaintiff was an
heir, would have constituted fraud. The facts in this case
are clearly distinguishable and must be distinguished in fairness to the case at bar.
At no place in their briefs do appellants make one reference to the record where there is any evidence that the administrator in the Charles Carson Estate had any knowledge
that was not fully disclosed to the Court. At no place is
there any evidence that Mrs. Carson had any knowledge that
\Yas not disclosed to the Court. The fact that there was a
claim of the existence of. two children was, of course, apparent
from the file itself. · Notice was given to .the children in
statutory form. The Court acquired jurisdiction of the estate
without question. Nine months were spent making searches,
conducting hearings. From sixty to seventy letters were sent
by the special administrator alone. Carson himself had made
a search. His attorneys had had correspondence with various
public officers and private individuals in an endeavor to locate
the plaintiffs.
Paintiffs, if they · are the children, were living under
names different from those by which·they had ever been known
to their· father or to their other relatives or childhood acquaintances. The Court had .possession of all knowledge
and facts relating to purported .children and of the facts
and claims as to the widow. It made a decision to the effect
that Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson was the sole surviving
heir of Charles Carson, deceased.
In subsequent petitions the administrator Norton adopted
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the finding of the Court and reported to the Court that she
. was the sole surviving known heir..
·
It is submitted that there is no authority and no law and
no principle of justice which asserts that the defendant Norton
is guilty of extrinsic fraud under these circumstances. Cer- ·
tainly appellants have been unable to point to any· such
authority in. Utah or elsewhere in their brief in this case.

POINT NO. V
THERE WAS NO .PROOF IN THE . CASE AT BAR
FROM WHICH THE COURT COULD INFER THAT
LOREN G. NORTON, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF CHARLES CARSON, DID NOT EXERCISE
THE CARE. AND PRUDENCE OF A REASONABLY PRUDENT ADMINISTRATOR WITH RESPECT TO THE
MATTER OF GIVING NOTICES AND MAKING ANY
SEARCH FOR THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION.
· Plaintiffs and Appellants urge in their brief under Point
No. 5 in substance that Loren G. Norton was guilty of negligence in failing to make further search for the· alleged children of Charles Carson during the administration of his estate. The appellants cite In Re Stevens Estate, 102 Utah, 255,
130 P 2d 85 (1942), Welch v. Flory, et al, 200 N.E.
900, (Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., 1936, and Morri.r
v. Mull, 144 N.E. 436, (Sup. Ct. of Ohio, ( 1924). These
cases do not assert the proposition that an adtninistrator
is liable for failure to make a search on the grounds of extrinsic fraud, or that the Decree of Distribution can be held
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for naught and set aside in ~.ffect for failure to make a search.
The question of fraud was not even considered.
The Utah case has been discussed heretofore. It holds
in effect that \vhen an administrator exercises the care of a
reasonable man, he is not liable for mistake or error in judgment.
In Welch v. Flory, supra, neither the administrator nor
any other person interested .in the estate wrote any letters or
solicited any knowledge of the alleged heirs from the Police
Department of Boston. The fact of the claim of an heir was
never brought to the attention of the probate judge. The administrator did not examine the city records o~ seek any information from that source by letters of inquiry. He did· not
even address a letter to· the alleged heir or examine the Boston
City Directory.
Certainly in the cas·e at bar the situation is entirely differ- ·
ent. As has been heretofore reiterated, a search was made for
nine months by the court, the special administrator ·and his
counsel,· and the deceased and his counsel before that. Letters
were addressed to the public officials in all of the states where
there was any indication that the alleged heirs may be located. Nearly $1,000.00 was paid out of the estate funds to the
persons engaged in this search. The. search made by the
deceased prior to his death-personal visits to all of the prior
residences of the family in North Dakota and Chicago-and
was reported to .the court and came to the attention of the
administrator. Based on the . evidence ·of these efforts, the
judge made its Order, supported by Findings -and Conclusions,
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to the effect that Mrs. Carson was the only known heir. Certainly the standard of reasonableness which the court passed
in Welch v. Flory is not applicable to the standard of Norton.
in the case at bar.
In Morris v. ·Mull, the Supreme Court of Ohio, 144 NE
436 ( 1924), cited by appellants on page 83 of their brief,
pointed out· that no notice whatever was given to the sister
of the executor. ((It is true that he claimed to have written
letters which were returned to him; yet unfortunately they
;vere not produced in evidence.;' The court pointed up facts
'which· indicated that the executor knew of the whereabouts
of ~his sister and had nevertheless reported to the probate court
that he did not know her address and had not heard from her
for more than fou~ years. The executor there had not followed the ·means. of information at his disposal relative to
the whereabouts of h1s sister. The court held that there was
a lack of good faith and a failure to use any diligence to
learn the· whereabouts of his sister.·
·•,

Certainly the facts in the Morris v. Mull cas.e must be
distinguished from the case at bar. Here, after the contest
which lasted nine months, the administrator, not being trained
in the law and not understanding fully the complexities of
the probate procedure, relied· upon his attorneys and the findings of ·the probate judge that Grace Catherine Carson was
the sole surviving heir.
It is easy enough, as Judge Lewis· pointed out at the trial,
to look back .now and say that most diligent administrators
would have ma_de application to the court for further instruc-
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tions. However, the la\v ~oes not require an administrator to
possess the learning of a historian looking on the matter in
retrospect.
Bancroft states (Bancroft Probate Practice, Second Edition, Vol. II, page 282, Sec. 3 3 5) : nThe duty of making an
investigation of the claims of alleged . heirs· and of taking or
considering the dispositions in connection with their claims
is likewise riot part of the ordinary duties of an adJ?inistrator."
The Supreme Court of Wyoming held in Black's Estate,
30 Wyo. 55, 215 P. 1059 (1923i), that searches for heirs and
investigators' claims of heirs was not an ordinary duty of an
administrator. Bancroft says tl;lat tin general, his duties are
to preserve the estate until distribution, to collect and safely
keep the property, to pay the indebtedness of the deceased.
and tPe charges of administration, and to put the estate in
such a condition that distribution may be had, and, when
claims are satisfied, to pass the estate pursuant to order of court
on to those entitled." Supra, page 279, Sec 334. As between the
contesting heirs or legatees, an administrator or executor is
a mere stakeholder and his duties are passive.
There is. no need. to speculate in this case as to whether
the probate judge might have or could have, or even should
have made an order requiring the use of estate funds to make
further search for alleged children of Charles Carson before
·the estate was distributed. As heretofore pointed out, the
only way in which the plaintiffs can recover in this case is by·
showing extrinsic fraud. It is sincerely submitted that acting
upon and pursuant to the order of the court in making dis-
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tribution under the circumstances of this case certainly was
not negligent. A fortiora there was no indication of fraud.
A proper considera:tion of alleged negligence by the administrator in not making a further search for Charles Carson's
children in the case at bar is the matter of proximate cause and
the fact that both plai~tiffs in this action lived under such
circumstances that it is very probable that an expenditure
of several thousand dollars could not disclose their whereabouts. It is entirely speculative as to whether the plaintiffs
ever could have been found ~y the most diligent search. Mildred · Molinari could not remember the number of names
she had us.ed since 192~· (R. 469). While her best judgment
at the commencement of the cross examination was that there
were about five (Ibid) , it appeared that she used the name
Mildred Allen in Detroit, Mildred Pelligrini in Chicago, Ann
Manners in Chicago, Mildred Felli in California, Marian
Ruso, Joan Wood in Chicago, Marcella Gordon in Chicago,
and Mildred Pelligrini in Milwaukee. In 1941 she gave her
name as Mildred Pelligrini in Chicago, and in August, 1948,
and January, 1950, in Chicago she gave her name as Mildred
Pelligrini.
These names were given to public officers, i. e. judges,
police sergeants, clerks of courts in the various cities and on
the dates named (See R. 469-4 74) . She admitted that she
had· never represented herself to any public official as Mildred
Molinari, and she could not remember one instance where
she· had made a public record under that name. She owned
real property in the names of her two boys (R. 477); she
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had been in touch with none of her relatives or the relatives
of her husband or family.

It appears that she could name

no relatives that even knew her address for a period of several
years (R. 486-487). She had never made any effort ·to find out
what happened to her father's property at Vetal, South Dakota
(R. 487); she had no social security number (R. 492), and
she was not listed in a telephone directory either by her business or personal address or under her name (R. 492-494.) She
has never owned an automobile (R. 496); she could not
remember ever having a driver's lice~se (R. 495) except
\vhen she was in California she had a license under the name
Pelligrini (R. 497).
She stated ~hat she had voted in Chicago since 193 7 under
the name Pelligrini (R. 499) .
Can it be stated that the proximate cause of any failure .
to find Mrs. Pelligrini was a lack of diligence by the administrator? A purposeful plan· to cut herself off from all of her
relatives and friends could hardly have been more complete.
The other plaintiff was known since 1927 or 1926 under
the name Tillier. He was never known under the name Tiller
or Swann. The driver's licenses and renewals identified as
"Exhibit A" all refer to ((Robert Tillier." The City of Chicago
Vehicle Licenses for 1947, 1948 and 1949 refer to nTillier."
The chauffeurs iicenses introduced for the years· -1942,
1945, 1946, 1948 refer to ((Robert Tillier." See also Exhibits D, E, F, and G, showing that all the chauffeur's
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and driver's licenses, registrations as a voter, the name
given to his employer and the name to which his telephone bill was sent was I(Tillier." Exhibit H shows that
~is

rent was·

pai~

under the name ((Tillier."

Exhibit I

indi~

cates that his light bills were paid under this name. Exhibit

J shows

that his gas bills were paid as Tillier, and Exhibit

K shows that his income tax returns were made under the
name ((Tillier."
This plaintiff stated on cross examination that he changed
his name from ((Swann" to ((Tillier" in approximately 1927
because he wanted to get back to the family name but he did
not remember of his father ever having his name different than
((Tiller." This plaintiff also lost all contact with his family and ·
friends. -He never made any attempt to locate his father,
except one inquiry of the. county recorder at Martin, South
Dakota, in or· about the year 1947, respecting property.
Whether this plaintiff made an effort knowingly to lose his
identity rna y be an open question. Whether he did or not,
a more complete job in obtaining this result could hardly
be imagined..
Can it be stated that there is sufficient evidence other than
speculation that the most diligent administ~ator could have
found plaintiffs? For nearly twenty years they lived under
names unknown to their former associates and their relatives·.
They chose to cut themselves off from their father's family
and their mother's fatnil y and if one letter was sent by either
of them to detennine the whereabouts of the father during
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this entire period of time, that represents the total extent of
their concern for h~. If children thus choose to ignore their
family ties, live in seclusion, cut off their identity and cut all
contacts with their friends and relatives, some consideration
should be given to the possibility that they should bear the
consequences of their own lack of interest.

CONCLUSION·
In this case the· trial court dismissed the action after
hearing plaintiff's evidence on the theory that it was insuffi- .
cient as a matter of law to show. any fraud or other .breach
of duty. The probate proceedings being in rem and .being
in compliance with _the Utah Statutes the determinations made
on these proceedings were res adjudicata. It is true that if
the plaintiffs are in fact the children of Charles ·carson, the
effect of the finalitY of the probate decree may result in some
apparent hardship· as to them. At least the hopes which have
been developed since the decree was entered _may meet .with
disappointment and frustration .. But the policy of the iaw _
is to require that issues come to final rest after adjudication.
Probate matters cannot be held in abeyance indefinitely. Indeed
·it must be admitted in perfect cand~r that most probate ·pro-· ·
ceedings are open too long to sati~fy reasonable requirements
of justice and expeditious· handling.
.

It is subrp.itted that those considerations C?f public policy
\vhich require complete determination of various matters in
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probate proceedings require that the determination of trial court
in the case at bar be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN & RICHARDS,
Attorneys for defendant} The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation} Ltd.
SBIELDS & SHIELDS,
Attorneys for E. LeRoy Shields, E. LeRoy Shields} Executor
of the Estate of Grace Catherine Carson} Loren G. Norton}
administrator of the estate of Grace Catherine Carson}.
deceased} and Loren G. N ortonJ individually.
R. VERN McC·ULLOUGH,
Attorney for cross defendant Edith Hazelrigg
JOHN D. RICE,
Attorney for cross defendant Cathedral of the Magdalene
Catholic Church} also known as Roman Catholic Bishop
of Salt Lake City) a corporation sole ..
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